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This paper aims to show how applying the system dynamics methodology to performance management can provide 
public sector organizations a powerful modeling perspective to prevent, detect and counteract behavioral distortions 
associated to performance measurement. A dynamic performance management approach is able to support performance 
management system designers to outline and implement a consistent set of measures that can allow public sector 
decision makers to pursue sustainable organizational learning and development.  
This perspective implies a major shift from a static to a dynamic picture of organizational processes and results. This 
means framing delays between causes and effects, feedback loops, and trade-offs in time and space associated with 
alternative scenarios. It also means understanding how different policy levers impact the accumulation and depletion of 
strategic resources over time, and determining how performance drivers affect end-results.  
An application of this perspective is outlined, in relation to crime control policies at Municipal level. Concerning this, 
unintended behavioral consequences generated by the implementation of the Compstat program (at the New York 
Police Department) on reward and performance management systems are framed through the ‘lenses’ of dynamic 
performance management. 
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1. Introduction. 
Particularly in the last decade, increasing efforts have been produced to improve efficiency and 
effectiveness in the provision of public services. Doing more with less has been a recurring label 
adopted by elected officials and public administrators to remark the goal of various formal 
performance measurement/management programs undertaken by government jurisdictions and 
public agencies in the world.    
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Although the premises of such programs (e.g., in terms of legislative issues, involved roles and 
responsibilities) have to some extent differed from country to country, it is possible to envisage a 
number of common crucial issues behind their effective implementation. In particular, a formal 
compliance to procedures and a narrow focus on the achievement of performance targets – rather 
than on the understanding of the factors affecting outputs and outcomes – are likely to jeopardize 
the achievement of the ultimate goals, i.e.: improving efficiency and effectiveness in service 
delivery. On this regard, the design of a balanced and comprehensive set of performance standards, 
based on the understanding of cause-and-effect relationships among the key-components of 
management strategies and related policies, has been emphasized as a fundamental step to avoid the 
risk of an “illusion of control”.  
In this context, the dysfunctional implications associated to the behavioral consequences of 
performance measurement are relevant issues to overcome the risk of inverting means with ends, or 
of adopting an only short-term view in implementing such programs. Both researchers and 
practitioners have advocated an outcome and learning-oriented perspective, fostering leadership and 
consensus building in performance management.  
The goal of this paper is to illustrate how a dynamic performance management view 1 can enhance a 
better understanding of the causes and effects related to adopted policies, undertaken actions and 
targeted results in the public sector.  
After an analysis of the literature on unintended behavioral consequences of performance 
management, the paper will illustrate the benefits arising from the use of a dynamic performance 
management view, in order to overcome such risks. 
Then, we will provide an application of such approach to a number problematic issues emerging 
from the Compstat program, adopted since the year 1994 by the New York Police Department. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The term “dynamic”, associated to “performance management”, is here used to identify a method to support decision 
makers in an organization to better understand and learn about cause-and-effect relationships between relevant factors 
affecting organizational outputs and outcomes over time. In particular, framing how (both information and material) 
delays affect such causal relationships is a characterizing attribute of a dynamic view of performance management. 
Furthermore, such view is systemic. In fact, it implies that delays in cause-and-effect relationships are framed by 
indentifying the relevant system’s structure, which generates observed behavior (i.e. performance). Also, this analysis 
implies that system’s boundaries are defined. Such boundaries identify the context in relation to which a number of 
interconnected variables (and decision makers affecting them) are recognized as major determinants of performance 
outputs and outcomes. Usually, within such boundaries, one may identify not only those variables and decision makers 
pertaining to a single organization, but also others, which – though they may be external in respect to a given 
organization – are relevant to affect its performance.  
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In particular, we will show how dynamic performance management applied to Municipal programs 
can strengthen the efforts towards the design of a consistent and comprehensive set of performance 
indicators, and move out of a static picture of organizational processes and results.  
 
2. Unintended consequences of performance measurement: an introduction. 
Dysfunctional behavioral effects in using budgets and performance measures to affect people and 
group behavior towards desired goals have been investigated since a relatively long time ago.  
A pioneering study on the field was provided by Argyris (1952), who gave rise to a new area of 
research, which was referred to as “Reliance on accounting performance measures”. Around this 
research stream, several scholars have contributed in the last decades (Hopwood, 1972; Otley, 
1978; Brownell, 1982; Hirst, 1983).  
Such studies emphasized the ambiguity perspective of performance measurement (Vakkuri & 
Meklin, 2006). They have been both developed – on the one hand – around the research on 
‘bounded rationality’ (March & Simon, 1958), on organizational behavior (Cyert & March, 1963) 
and on the ambiguities in the link between information and decision making (March, 1987), and – 
on the other hand – around the research on rationality and cause-and-effect relationships in decision 
making (Simon, 1955). On this regard, it has been remarked that cognitive limitations, conflicting 
interests, uncertainty, paradoxes and ambivalences often make performance measurement a difficult 
task.  
Otley (1978) remarked how dysfunctional behavior in using information provided by management 
accounting systems is often originated by lack of consistency between information and the 
underlying complexity of the task environment, or by technical inadequacy of the information itself 
(Mintzberg, 1975). This implies that various organizational participants often ignore, or even 
manipulate or falsify information, in order to achieve their own personal goals, regardless the 
organization’s needs.   
Another important stream of research on behavioral distortions in using budgets was started 
following to the seminal studies of Hofstede (1967; 1978; 1981).  His work demonstrated how the 
cybernetic approach through which the management control process was traditionally modeled – 
when applied to contexts where objectives are missing, unclear or shifting, and the outcomes from 
achieved results are not measurable – may generate unintended and undesirable effects.  “Budget 
gaming” and opportunistic behavior are among the most evident results emerging from a budget 
process and information whose structure does not fit with the task environment. On this regard, 
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Hofstede recommended the use of political control, as an alternative to cybernetic control, which 
may fit with those contexts where managerial processes and expected results can be parameterized 
through standards. According to such alternative framework (i.e., political control), decisions are 
based on negotiations and judgment. Decisions often deal with policies, which are not composed by 
only rational elements, but also consist of cultural values, which are shared by different people 
belonging to a group.    
Ouchi (1979) proposed a similar framework. He identified three different logics for management 
controls, i.e.: bureaucratic, market, and clan control. Again, such a distinction was based on the 
characteristics of the task environment, concerning: the ability to measure outputs, and the level of 
knowledge of the transformation process. A ‘clan’ form of control, based on ritual and ceremony, 
was suggested for those contexts where the ability to measure outputs is low and the knowledge of 
the transformation process is imperfect (Birnberg et al, 1983). Lack of consideration of the need to 
adopt a contingency approach in the design of management control systems to take into account the 
characteristics of the organization, may generate an “illusion of control”. This would give rise to a 
number of dysfunctional consequences to individuals, groups, and the organization as a whole 
(Dermer & Lucas, 1986).  
Though not explicitly referred as performance management or measurement, a similar approach can 
be found in the conceptual framework outlined by Mintzberg (1979, chapter 1), based on the search 
of a consistency between the design of coordinating mechanisms with the characteristics of tasks. 
As Mintzberg remarks, for those complex tasks, characterized by unknown processes and the 
difficulty to measure outputs, adopting standardization as a coordinating mechanism may generate 
dysfunctional effects. Therefore, “mutual adjustment” is suggested in these cases. It is worth 
remarking that, though the adoption of a given coordinating mechanism for the fulfillment of a 
certain task is alternative to the adoption of others, the use of a proper mix of mechanisms can be 
appropriated to coordinate a single unit carrying out heterogeneous tasks with other units.  
Merchant (1982) outlined a similar conceptual model, distinguishing action control from results and 
personnel control. 
 
3. On the dysfunctional behavioral effects produced by improper use of performance 
indicators in the public sector. 
In the early ‘90s, based on the described findings developed since the beginning of the ‘50s, a new 
stream of research started to point out how the specific public sector complexity may amplify the 
challenges imposed to performance management system designers by the dysfunctional behavioral 
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effects arising from the improper use of indicators. In fact, the public sector is characterized by a 
number of attributes that sharply differentiate it from the private and ‘for-profit’ sector.  
Among the most relevant specific factors in this context are the difficulties by a public sector 
organization in: 1) achieving consensus on the outputs of delivered services and on the metrics to 
adopt to measure them; 2) identifying the outcomes corresponding to such outputs, and measure 
them; 3) communicating with stakeholders covering different roles (i.e.: citizens, service users, 
elected officials, and managers) to involve them in using performance measures and adapt their 
behavior to the improvement of generated outcomes over time (Smith, 1993).  
Other important specific complexity factors in the public sector are related to the need to:  
1) pursue a proper fit between the profile of performance management systems and the profile of 
the institutional and political/cultural systems characterizing the society where a territorial public 
sector organization operates (Borgonovi, 1996, p. 105; Bianchi et al, 2010);  
2) search for a sustainable performance development which is both based on an institutional (or 
organizational) level, and on an interinstitutional (or territorial) perspective. According to this 
last perspective, assessing performance sustainability requires not only a focus on the single 
organization’s results, but also on how such results contribute to the wider system’s 
performance, a factor that will affect the single organization in the long run (Bianchi, 2012, p. 
146-149). This implies a need to adopt a joined-up – or whole-of-government – approach (Boyle, 
1999; Christensen & Laegreid, 2009, p.33-35; Johnson, 2005; Pollitt, 2003). Such a perspective 
requires that – for the successful design, implementation, and evaluation of public policy 
outcomes – different units (e.g. agencies or ministries) related to a public sector organization and 
different independent public (and private) sector institutions operating in a given territory should 
establish collaboration.  
The need of joined-up-government is particularly strong when the so-called cross cutting issues are 
hot topics in the political agenda. For example, this is the case of social policies, encompassing 
different interconnected sectors, such as: immigration, education, health care, safety, welfare, and 
housing.  Since the public sector units and institutions acting to satisfy such social needs (which are 
referred to individuals, groups, and the community) may play different roles, with a substantial 
level of autonomy, a major threat for performance management systems is that the focus on single 
output measures by each player may not guarantee that the achievement of such outputs will lead to 
the achievement of the wider pursued outcomes to the benefit of the community (Smith, 1993). 
Such a potential inconsistency between outputs and outcomes in designing and implementing 
performance management systems can be described as an effect of a lack of systemic view of the 
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phenomena around which decision makers’ actions and results should be focused, in order to pursue 
sustainable development (Bianchi, 2012). A bounded, short-term, and static view is often adopted 
when performance measures are set in the described contexts. Therefore, the risk of dysfunctional 
behavioral effects from the improper design and use of indicators in public sector performance 
management may arise not only because of an inconsistency between the adopted performance 
measures and the characteristics of the task environment, but also because of a static and non-














In the first case, dysfunctional behavioral effects are primarily detected at individual level. As 
described in the next section of this paper, this is the research area on which most of the literature 
on this topic seems to be focused. Such behavior is associated to goal displacement, i.e. deliberate 
actions of employees to pursue individual or group goals, which diverge from organizational goals. 
Regarding such behavior, misrepresentation and gaming are recurring phenomena. 
In the second case, dysfunctional behavioral effects are, instead, detected at organizational level. As 
described later (sections 6 and 7 of this paper), this behavior is characterized by an emerging and 
gradual – rather than deliberate – action, which arises from a lack of consistency in the design of 
performance management system with other coordination mechanisms, such as the rewards and 
career systems. This phenomenon gives rises to a weak span of support (Simons, 2005), i.e. a low 
Figure 1: Primary factors leading to dysfunctional behavioral effects of performance 
management systems in the public sector.  
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propensity of the organization to produce collaborative actions towards a group of shared goals, 
whose achievement is considered as a means to attain both group and individual goals.  
From the discussion here developed emerges how, if we consider the relationship between outputs 
and outcomes – related to a given responsibility area – the relevant boundaries of the dynamic 
feedback structure generating the observed behavior (i.e., outcomes) associated to the investigated 
problems are often much broader than those related to the ‘levers’ on which each unit is enabled to 
act. A lack of awareness of the mismatch between the system boundaries perceived at a local (or 
organizational) level and those characterizing the broader system generating the observed 
outcomes, which will provide the inputs to the next budget cycle for each agent, is a major cause of 
dysfunctional behavior, which is primarily intrinsic to performance management systems, rather 
than to the behavior of specific groups or individuals (fig. 2).  
For example, crime prevention/detection/repression, in order to be effective in the long run, would 
require collaboration and policy coordination between different institutions. In fact, the 
effectiveness of a police department – in the long run – is subordinate to its capability not only to 
prevent or repress crime, but also to the capability of the wider system (e.g. schools, courts, other 
public safety institutions, non-profit sector organizations) to keep crime under control, i.e. to reduce 
its inflow (new and reiterated crime) and to increase its outflows (repressed and detected crime).  
Figure 3 illustrates how both prevention and repression policies are relevant leverage points to 












Figure 2: A major cause of dysfunctional behavioral effects in public sector 
performance management: the mismatch between the relevant system’s boundaries 
and the boundaries of each agency’s performance management systems.  















For example, if the police would only be focused on dealing with uncontrolled (i.e. undetected) 
crimes, and it would be made accountable on a main performance indicator, e.g. the number of 
detected crimes (output measure), even attaining this only measure might not lead to a reduction in 
the stock of (uncontrolled) crime in the territory (outcome measure). Though an increasing pattern 
of detected crimes by the police might signal efficiency in using staff and means, this would not 
necessarily imply that the police are effective too. In fact, without a synergy between different 
actors involved in crime control policy making, there would be the risk that the reinforcing loop 
originated by reiterated crime would prevail over the two balancing loops (B1 and B2), from 
effective crime prevention and repression policies, that would allow one to reduce and keep steadily 
low the crime level, over time 2.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  It is worth remarking that the ‘+’ and ‘-‘ signs of the arrows in fig. 3 mean a direct and inverse relationship between a 
variable and another one, respectively. A reinforcing loop is determined by a positive polarity (if we multiply the 
algebraic signs of the links in the loop). A balancing loop implies a negative polarity, which is again determined by the 
multiplication of the algebraic signs of the links in the loop. While a reinforcing loop generates exponential growth in 
the affected variable’s behavior mode (so it implies an instability in the system), a balancing loop fosters a stable 
behavior. The principles behind the study of the structure and behavior of systems over time, through the identification 
and analysis of dominant feedback loops, refer to system dynamics (Forrester, 1961). More details on System Dynamics 
applied to performance management will be illustrated in the section 6 of this paper.          
Figure 3: Balancing (or counteracting) and reinforcing (or vicious) loops behind 
sustainable crime control policies. 	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The described phenomenon of lack of framing linkages between outputs and outcomes in 
performance measurement is often a major cause of lack of efforts towards the development of 
formal and/or informal coordinating mechanisms between elected officials and administrators and 
between different independent agencies. Such phenomena may generate a fracture between 
managerial and political control. They may also tend to encourage a sectoral and departmental view 
of administration.  
The perception of such mismatches by performance management systems designers, policy makers 
and managers in public agencies is fundamental to avoid a ritual and superficial adoption of 
budgeting and performance indicators, leading to an ‘illusion of control’ and opportunistic 
behavior. Conversely, in order to make use of performance management systems as a learning-
oriented tool (Moynihan – Landuyt, 2009; Vakkuri & Meklin, 2006, p. 240-242), broadening the 
observed system’s boundaries as previously described, can support a shift of focus from 
measurement to management, from data collection to systematic use of information, from an input 
or output to an outcome view of organizational results (Matheson et al, 1997; Moynihan, 2008). 
Current use of performance measurement is surprisingly limited (Behn, 2002, 2003; de Lancer 
Julnes, 2008; de Lancer Julnes & Holtzer, 2001). According to Sanger (2012, p. 185), “performance 
measurement rarely leads to improvement government performance or more efficient and 
accountable municipal management”.  Committed leadership (Bianchi & Rivenbark, 2012-a, p. 521; 
Moynihan, 2008, p. 78) is the key to implement performance management systems, according to a 
learning-oriented approach (Sanger, 2008). Performance management ought to change behavior. 
Based on the analysis conducted in this section, to move towards this direction it can be useful to 
combine an “external” (which is primarily outcome-oriented) with an “internal” (which is primarily 
output-oriented) view in the design of performance management systems for a public agency or any 
other autonomous public sector organization unit (Bianchi, 2010, p. 373-375).    
 
4. Profiling the causes underlying dysfunctional behavioral effects produced by improper use 
of performance indicators in the public sector. 
It is possible to distinguish three major limitations of performance measurement, i.e. attribution, 
representation of quality, and goal displacement (De Lancer Julnes, 2006).  
“Attribution” refers to the possibility that the causal connection between a given set of outputs and 
outcomes, and a corresponding set of actions, might be erroneous, biased, or partial. This 
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phenomenon can be a major problem to pursue and implement the accountability principle, to 
evaluate performance, correct objectives or actions, motivate and reward people. 
“Representation of quality” refers to an intrinsic problem in any attempt to measure the results of 
accomplished actions, and related outcomes (Bouckaert & Halligan, 2008, chapter 8). On the one 
hand, the more one refers to only a single performance measure, the higher the risk to make a 
simplistic and partial causation analysis will be. On the other hand, the broader and detailed the 
adopted performance indicators set is, the less selective the analysis and interpretation of emerging 
results will be (Van Dooren et al, 2010, p. 160).      
A third important limitation of performance measurement is “goal displacement”.        
Flamohltz (1996) defines goal displacement as “a lack of goal congruence created by motivation to 
achieve some goals sought by the organization at the expense of other intended goals”. According 
to Flamohltz, goal displacement may be caused by several phenomena, including: sub-optimization, 
selective attention to organizational goals, and inversion of means and ends. Sub-optimization 
occurs when performance of an organizational unit is achieved at the expense of another unit, or the 
organization as a whole. Selective attention occurs when certain goals are pursued at the expense of 
other goals. Birnberg at al (1983, p. 121-122) define a similar phenomenon as “Focusing”. 
Inversion of means and ends occurs when performance measures and reward systems tend to 
motivate people to only achieve certain intermediate results, rather than also the overall (i.e. final) 
organizational goals. The last two phenomena have also been defined as “Tunnel vision” and 
“Myopia”, respectively (Smith, 1993, 1995). 
Bohte and Meier (2000) define goal displacement as individual’s tendency to maximize certain 
outputs at the expense of related outcomes. In respect to this, they identify three major forms of 
organizational cheating, i.e.: “cutting corners”, lying, and biasing samples. The “Cutting corners” 
practice occurs when decision makers focus on quantity, rather than quality. “Lying” is a practice 
that occurs when decision makers try to take advantage of information asymmetries between their 
agencies and external evaluators, with a purposeful action oriented to provide information that may 
put them in a positive light. “Biasing samples” is a third possible goal displacement technique 
implying that decision makers select and report only those cases that may mostly lead to positive 
evaluations. For instance, agency activity may only be directed towards those easy cases, requiring 
a minor effort than other more difficult cases.    
Other similar dysfunctional behavior modes, which are encouraged by an excessive use of outcome-
related performance indicators (ORPIs) in the public sector, have been identified as (Smith, 1993, 
1995):  
	   11	  
- convergence i.e. “an emphasis on not being exposed as an outlier on any ORPI, rather than the 
desire to be outstanding” (Smith, 1993, p. 141); 
- ossification, i.e. “a disinclination to experiment with new and innovative methods” (Smith, 
1993, p. 141); 
- misrepresentation, i.e. a “deliberate manipulation of data so that reported behavior differs from 
actual behavior” (Smith, 1995, p. 292). Concerning this phenomenon, Birnberg et al (1983, p. 
121-124) identified a number of corresponding methods of distorting the information system, 
such as: “Smoothing”, “Biasing”, “Filtering”, and “Illegal acts”;  
- gaming, i.e. a “deliberate manipulation of behavior to secure strategic advantage” (Smith, 1995, 
p. 298; Radnor, 2005). Van Dooren et al (2010, p. 162-165) have qualified similar phenomena 
as: “measure fixation” and “cream skimming”. This last case is related to the possibility that – 
when confronted with output measures – organizations may be tempted to select the intake 
(Behn & Kant, 1999).     
Based on the described conceptual framework provided by the literature on the dysfunctional 
behavioral effects produced by performance indicators in the public sector, Vakkuri & Meklin 
(2006, p. 244-246) propose a thought provoking theoretical extension of the existing body of 
knowledge on the field. They observe that the list of possible dysfunctions originates from 
heterogeneous theoretical and methodological underpinnings, which range from theory of 
accounting measurement (e.g. tunnel vision, misrepresentation, and convergence), to optimization 
theory (e.g. sub-optimization), to the theory of organizational behavior and learning (e.g. myopia, 
ossification), and game theory (e.g. gaming). The heterogeneity of the research field may suggest 
the need of a more theoretical discussion of ambiguity. Such logical process of analysis has led the 
authors to identify two main contexts related to the described phenomena. On this regard, the 
authors claim that, if it is true that “the users may deliberately employ performance measurement 
systems for their unique individual, organizational and political purposes” (Vakkuri & Meklin, 
2006, p. 244), it is also true that “performance measurement systems set the conditions for 
organizational actors to adapt to” (Vakkuri & Meklin, 2006, p. 245).  
In other cases, distortions in interpreting performance information can be mainly due to the 
characteristics of the adopted measurement system, rather than to the behavior of people. For 
instance, this happens when a phenomenon is measured more frequently and accurately than in the 
past, generating the feeling of an increase of its intensiveness or frequency over time, or in 
comparison to other contexts where the same phenomenon is not so closely monitored (Bouckaert 
& Balk, 1991).  
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5. Detecting, preventing, and explaining unintended effects of performance measurement in 
the public sector: the “performance paradox” theory. 
The several conceptualizations shown in the last section about the possible causes of dysfunctional 
effects of performance management in the public sector have been effectively framed by the so-
called “Performance paradox” theory. Based on a private sector research, Meyer and 
O’Shaughnessy (1993) coined the term “performance paradox” (Leeuw, 2003) to mean a 
phenomenon characterized by a weak capability of performance indicators to measure and affect 
performance (Meyer & Gupta, 1994). The performance paradox implies that adopted indicators lose 
their own capability to discriminate good and bad performers, because organizations adapt their 
performance (i.e. people actions) to them (Van Dooren et al, 2010, p. 165).  
Later, Van Tiel & Leuw (2002, p. 271), provided relevant examples of how the deterioration of 
performance indicators may affect also the public sector. 
Apart from the so-called positive learning – implying an increased capability over time by people to 
systematically reach performance targets, although this may not automatically mean an 
improvement in the overall organizational performance (especially in terms of outcomes) – the 
authors describe the phenomenon of perverse learning. Regarding this, overrepresentation and 
underrepresentation of performance provide a real challenge to the quality and effectiveness of a 
performance management/measurement system, generated by the “performance paradox”. In these 
two cases, reported performance is actually – respectively – worse and better than the actual one. 
The underlying cause is often a focus on a single indicator or on a too bounded set of them, and/or 
on only single short-term indicators, which should rather be considered as “drivers” (together with 
other measures) for the attainment of outcome (or “end-result”) indicators, describing the value 
generated by the public sector to service users and the community.   
Therefore, while positive learning can be considered as a physiological characteristics of the 
“performance paradox”, requiring periodical revision of adopted performance measures and 
standards, a disconnection between performance drivers and end-results (and, more broadly 
speaking, a static approach) as well as a too tight scope of adopted indicators can be considered as 
recurring pathologies of the investigated phenomenon. 
Van Thiel & Leuw (2002, p. 271) provide an interesting example of the risks of under or 
overrepresentation of performance by discussing the case of the Dutch police. They observe how 
focusing the only and aggregate performance measure of the percentage or the number of crimes 
solved by the police in a given time may give rise to wrong conclusions. In fact, if we consider the 
percentage of crimes solved as a single performance measure, a decrease in such indicator would 
suggest that police performance is deteriorating. However, this might not be necessarily true if – 
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although more perpetrators have been arrested, prosecuted and penalized than before – the 
reduction in the percentage of crimes solved would result from an increase in the stock of crimes, 
due to an inflow of new committed crimes which is higher than the outflow of crimes solved in a 
give time period. Likewise, an increase in the crimes solved over a number of years (which would 
indicate a better performance) is likely to determine – other things being equal – a reduction in the 
stock of perpetrators. This would make more difficult for the police to further improve – or even to 
keep stable – the number of crimes solved, in the future. However, a reduction in this indicator, 
which is primarily due to a drop in the stock of perpetrators – generated by the past good police 
performance – would not indicate a performance deterioration.  
This example suggests, first of all, that – particularly when a single performance measure is adopted 
– a special attention should be paid in setting and explaining the value of the standard. In the 
analyzed case, this would mean that the absolute standard (i.e., the number of crimes solved) might 
be reduced in consideration of the reduction of the corresponding stock. A problem in implementing 
this correction could be due to the difficulties in estimating the number of perpetrators, particularly 
if one considers that – beyond the notified crimes – there is often a number of unknown crimes, and 
of potential perpetrators (which can be very hard to estimate), who might commit crime in the 
future. 
In this case, focusing on a single performance indicator – and in such a static manner – might 
generate unintended consequences. In particular, for example, forcing the police to keep the number 
of solved crimes (or the percentage of solved crimes on total) stable – regardless the reduction in 
the stock of perpetrators – might give rise to gaming phenomena (i.e. perverse learning). In fact, the 
police might be inclined to increase (even beyond the socially tolerable levels) the pressure on the 
community in the search of a number of crimes to deal with and to report. This is a typical example 
of inversion between means and ends. 
Furthermore, the problem of evaluating police performance in the described context could be 
exacerbated by the use of a single and aggregate measure of crime, rather than by differentiating – 
for example – felonies from misdemeanors. Also, if one considers the number of crimes – rather 
than the number of criminals too – performance evaluation might be affected by the percentage of 
crimes committed by several people together, like it may happen – for instance – in the cases of 
vandalism. If we take into account this phenomenon, the adopted performance measure should have 
also to consider the number of arrested criminals per crime solved.       
Extending the boundaries of the observed system, in terms of adopted measures, might reduce the 
risk of performance paradox. For example, rather than focusing on only the crimes solved, the 
police might also be made accountable on a set of measures that would describe the effectiveness of 
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its crime prevention efforts. Obviously, one should properly estimate the different delays 
characterizing the connection between the adoption of crime prevention policies and their effects on 
the two inflows related to the new committed crimes and the new perpetrators. Though it is true that 
focusing on output measures may give a feeling of certainty and clarity in performance evaluation, 
it is also true that combining output with outcome measures is likely to better support purposeful 
action, coordination between actors, and reporting to different stakeholders. A focus on crime 
prevention, combined to crime repression would also allow the police to take an active role in 
designing and implementing broader social policies, in coordination with other actors, especially 
those operating in the public and private “not-for-profit” sector (for instance, schools and associated 
stakeholders).        
Another possible measure that may help public sector organizations to detect and prevent a 
“performance paradox” is introducing in the performance management system proper mechanisms 
that can enable decision makers to perceive and track inertial phenomena that gradually generate 
the depletion of resources primarily affecting organizational outputs and outcomes. Such 
phenomena are difficult to perceive by static performance measurement systems. In fact, they are 
characterized by slow – but continuous – flows depleting relevant stocks, which (after even long 
delays) will suddenly generate destructive effects. Though the negative events produced by such 
phenomena may often eventually seem unexpected – and, therefore, unpredictable – they might 
have been tracked well in advance and corrective or preventive measures might have been timely 
adopted if the weak signs of change in a number of (often intangible) resources would have been 
detected by the organization performance management system.   
Van Thiel & Leuw (2002, p. 276) provide another clear example of this phenomenon, in relation to 
a tragic event that took place in the Dutch city of Enschede in the year 2000. By that time, a 
firework factory explosion killed more than 20 people. The tragedy would have, probably, been 
avoided if the current monitoring process by the local and central governments, inspectorates, and 
the fire department over a number of ‘small’ illegal activities would have been regularly and 
effectively carried out. Conversely, lack of supervision over these activities gave rise to automatic 
renewal of a number of licenses to operate in the residential area. Therefore, the gradual 
accumulation of small problems inertially reduced the level of safety (strategic resource) of the 
area. Though the potential problem was constantly rising, it was not evident to the community, until 
the tragedy manifested it as a completely new event 3.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 The recent explosion of a fertilizer plant in West Texas, reflecting storage of anhydrous ammonia without proper 
federal reporting may reflect a similar condition. See: Smith (2013) Records: Texas plant hadn't told feds about 
explosive fertilizer. Retrieved June 11, 2013, from www.cnn.com/2013/04/25/us/texas-explosion-plant 
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The discussion developed so far provides the logical premise to claim for a more systems-oriented 
and dynamic performance management/measurement process in public sector organizations. A 
proper method to frame performance sustainability should have to consider how the activities 
carried out by the organization contribute to build up and deploy a bundle of – tangible and 
intangible – stocks of strategic resources, with a view to affect a balanced set of outputs and 
outcomes. Such perspective of performance should also consider whether a single public sector 
organization is contributing with other organizations to generate and deliver value to service users 
and the community.  
In the next section of this paper we will illustrate how to build and implement dynamic performance 
management systems to prevent, detect, and counteract the risks of performance paradox in public 
sector organizations.           
 
6. Dynamic performance management: a modeling perspective to support organizations to 
prevent, detect and counteract behavioral distortions associated to performance 
measurement.  
One approach to overcome the myopic view in designing and using performance indicators to affect 
decision makers’ behavior in the public sector is System Dynamics (SD).  
SD is a modeling methodology that is adopted to map system structure to capture and communicate 
an understanding of behavior driving processes and the quantification of the relationships to 
produce a set of equations that form the basis for simulating possible system behaviors over time.  
The underlying principle is that, if process structure determines system behavior, and system 
behavior determines organization performance (Davidsen, 1991; Richardson – Pugh, 1981, p. 15; 
Sterman, 2000, p. 28-29), then the key to developing sustainable strategies to improve performance 
is acknowledging the relationship between processes and behaviors and managing the leverage 
points.  
The advantage of using this approach is placing performance measures into the broader context of 
the system (Bianchi – Rivenbark, 2012-b), responding to the reality that even simple policy and 
process changes to impact specific outputs and outcomes are not likely to be that “simple” in 
organizations (Bianchi et al, 2008).  
A key for applying SD to performance management is the so-called “instrumental” view of 
performance (Bianchi 2012, p. 153-155). The instrumental view implies that alternative means for 
improving performance be made explicit. In this regard, it is necessary to identify both end-results 
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and their respective drivers. To affect such drivers, each responsibility area must build up, preserve, 
and deploy a proper endowment of strategic resources that are systemically linked to each other. 
Strategic resources are modeled as stocks of available tangible or intangible factors in a given time. 
Their dynamics depend on the value of corresponding inflows and outflows. Such flows are 
modeled as “valves” on which decision makers can act through their policies, in order to influence 
the dynamics of each strategic resource, and therefore—through them—performance indicators 
(Bianchi, 2010). 
The maintenance of an appropriate balance between strategic resources is the key to sustainable 
development. Each strategic resource should provide the basis to sustain others in the same system. 
For instance, both workers and equipment provide capacity, which influences perceived service 
quality. This affects territory attractiveness, which, in turn, influences population dynamics. A 
change in the population that a municipality must serve will affect workload and perhaps the stock 
of available financial resources, and eventually capacity and service.  
The feedback loops underlying the dynamics of the different strategic resources imply that the 
flows affecting such resources are measured over a time lag. Therefore, understanding how delays 
influence strategic resources and achieved results becomes a key-issue to manage performance in 
dynamic complex systems.  
Managing strategic resources to affect performance is a dynamic and complex task. In fact, 
intangible resources (e.g., organizational climate, trust, knowledge, and image) are difficult to 
identify and measure. Furthermore, processes of accumulation and drain affecting the dynamics of 
strategic resources are inertial, since delays underlying them are difficult for decision-makers to 
perceive, and also because effects generated by actions taken (or not taken) in a recent or remote 
past are intertwined with each other, and single causes cannot be easily matched to related effects. 
A critical tipping point in managing strategic resources to affect organizational performance is 
associated with the capability of policy-makers to: a) identify those strategic resources that most 
determine success in the environment where an organization or different organizations operate; b) 
insure that the endowment of such resources is satisfactory over time, and c) keep a proper balance 
between the different strategic resources. 
Figure 4 frames the logical structure of a generic dynamic performance management (DPM) model, 
according to the “instrumental” view. It shows how the end-results provide an endogenous source 
in an organization to the accumulation and depletion processes affecting strategic resources. In fact, 
they can be modeled as in- or out-flows, which change over a given time span the corresponding 
stocks of strategic resources, as a result of actions implemented by decision makers. End-results 
that most synthetically measure the overall organizational performance are flows affecting the 
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accumulation of corresponding strategic resources that cannot be purchased. These are: 1) resources 
generated by management routines, and 2) financial resources (Bianchi, 2012). 
Figure 4 also highlights that performance drivers are a measure of factors on which to act in order 
to affect the final performance. They are measured in relative terms, i.e. as a ratio between 
organizational or territorial (inter-institutional) performance perceived by the community or specific 
groups of service users and a benchmark, or target. Such denominator must be gauged in relation to 
either perceived past performance, or users’ expectations, or even competitors’ (e.g. other 
territories) performance. For instance, if related to an end-result such as the number of new business 
initiatives undertaken in a urban area in a given time span, corresponding performance drivers could 
be associated to the (financial and socio-political) perceived stability of a region, and to the 
perceived transparency and promptness of the public sector (e.g., in terms of authorization protocols 
or supply of various services, such as those related to security, transportation, social assistance, 











In order to affect such drivers in the desired direction, each decision maker must build up, preserve 
and deploy a proper endowment of tangible and intangible strategic resources systemically linked 
each other.  
The growth of a single organization and of a territorial community (e.g., a urban area) embracing 
different institutions can be sustainable if the rate at which end-results change the endowment of 
corresponding strategic resources is balanced. This implies that each institutional decision maker is 
able to increase the mix of strategic resources and that this increase is not obtained by reducing the 
endowment of the wider strategic resources in the territory. 
Figure 4: A dynamic performance management view framed through  
an “instrumental” perspective.	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End-results can be measured over a sequential chain and positioned on several layers. “Last layer” 
end-results are those changing the endowment of strategic resources that cannot be purchased. To 
affect the results positioned on this “last layer,” further layers must be identified. For example, cash 
flows can be affected by the current income and net working capital flows. These more detailed 
financial measures are, in turn, affected by non-monetary, end-results. So, activity volumes affect 
revenues and the net working capital flow. They also affect purchase volumes, which impact on 
purchase costs and (through purchases on credit and the change in inventory) on the net working 
capital flow. Therefore, activity volumes can be located on a first layer of end-results. Such results 
can be affected through performance drivers. 
An application of DPM through the instrumental view to the case of the Dutch police, described at 
the end of the last section, is framed in figure 5. 
The three-level framework (strategic resources  performance drivers  end-results) here depicted 
contributes to identify and to counteract possible dysfunctions generated by the ‘performance 
paradox’.   
As commented in the last section, focusing performance measurement on a single and static 
indicator might force the police to generate actions to increase the number of solved crimes (or the 
percentage of solved crimes on total) – regardless the possible consequential reduction in the stock 
of perpetrators, that would make more a more difficult to attain the same performance of the 
previous years. To counteract the problem, the police might be inclined to increase (even beyond 
the socially tolerable levels) the pressure on the community in the search of a number of crimes to 
deal with and to report. In other words, in this example the risk of gaming is associated to the 
possibility that – although without a deliberate purpose – the police staff and other means (strategic 
resources) might be deployed to pursue a set of performance drivers (mainly represented by 
workload measures, such as the number of controls or investigations undertaken in a given time), 
with the intent to “make the numbers” needed to achieve the final targets.  
If solving crimes and reducing the corresponding stock contributes to improve the community’s 
quality of life, an excess of controls and investigations – perhaps beyond socially tolerable levels – 
may offset in the long run the positive effects of the described policy. This might reduce the 
community’s quality of life. This might also generate a reduction in the level of population and an 
increase in the inflow of new committed crimes. In other words, an excess of focus and intensive 
efforts on a single policy might generate side effects in the long run. In this case, such effects could 
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be related to an increase of the number of crimes per inhabitant, which would generate a further 




This analysis suggests a possible a possible way to counteract the behavioral distortion that a 
performance paradox might generate in this case. As also described in the previous section of the 
paper, extending the boundaries of the observed system, in terms of adopted measures and 
corresponding policies, might reduce the risk of gaming and unintended behavioral effects. For 
example, the police might also be made accountable on a set of measures that would gauge the 
effectiveness of crime prevention. A focus on crime prevention, combined to crime repression 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Though the described model has been intentionally kept simple, it is worth remarking that the stock of criminals 
should have been here divided into several classes, related to the level of seriousness of committed crimes. As it will be 
commented with more detail in the next section of this paper, lack of clarity in the method for distinguishing and 
categorizing crimes, according their level of seriousness, might originate ‘gaming’ behavior by the police decision 
makers, with the intent to maximize outputs, performance rating, and related rewards. In fact, police might 
simultaneously oversolve ‘easy to solve’ crimes (e.g. through ‘stop & frisk’ techniques) and undersolve ‘hard to solve’ 
crimes. On this regard, it has been emphasized the need of designing clear rules to avoided to catch the ‘dolphins’, 
rather than the ‘sharks’ (Maple 1999, p. 155).     
Figure 5: Using  ‘Dynamic Performance Management’ to model the unintended effects 
produced by the performance paradox: the Dutch police example.  	  
	   20	  
would also allow the police to take an active role in designing and implementing broader social 
policies, in coordination with other actors. 
Figure 6 shows how this extension of the explored system’s boundaries might be made possible by 
adopting a modeling approach based on DPM, according to an instrumental view. The figure shows 
how – among the end-results – two more flows are taken into account for performance evaluation, 
i.e.: the new perpetrators and the new potential perpetrators. Correspondingly, also the stock of 
potential perpetrators is added as a relevant resource to which to refer in order to formulate policies 
that may contribute to a sustainable community development. Also, a second set of performance 
drivers is included in this alternative context, i.e.: the number of controls and preventive actions.    
Based on the analysis developed so far, in the next section we will frame, through a DPM approach, 
a number of problematic behavioral issues (and related implications on performance 
management/measurement) emerging from the Compstat program of the New York Police 
















 Figure 6: Using ‘Dynamic Performance Management’ to counteract the unintended 
effects produced by the performance paradox: the Dutch police example. 	  
	   21	  
7. Applying dynamic performance management to analyze the behavioral distortions 
associated to performance measurement: insights from the “Compstat” Program at New 
York Police Department.  
In the year 1994, the New York Police Department introduced CompStat, a statistics-based 
performance measurement system aiming to motivate employees, with a specific focus on precinct 
commanders, with the purpose to sharply reduce crime (Silverman, 2001, p. 88–89, 101; Behn, 
2003, p. 591). It is claimed that in New York City, after Compstat was introduced, major crimes 
have declined over 76 % (Eterno & Silverman, 2010, p. 428). 
Following to the successful results of Compstat, similar programs have been subsequently adopted 
by many other city agencies, not only in the USA (e.g. Australia, Scotland, Canada).  
For instance, a similar program is Citistat, i.e. “a data-driven management system designed to 
monitor and improve the performance of city departments in real-time. Implemented in Baltimore 
in 2000 by then Mayor Martin O’Malley, Citistat uses basic, inexpensive computer software to 
track a myriad of government performance indicators. Managers of each city department report to 
City Hall every two weeks to present their performance data and answer questions from the mayor’s 
office. The mayor’s office uses this data to identify underperformance and press for improvements” 
(Perez & Rushing, 2007, p. 3). Both Compstat and Citistat draw many of their conceptual 
underpinnings from the so-called ‘Broken Windows’ theory. Wilson & Kelling (1983) firstly 
theorized that – in order to prevent major crime – police must be attentive also to minor quality of 
life offenses, and use assertive methods, starting from avoiding leaving a broken window 
unattended. According to this theory, unattended broken windows are a symptom of negligence for 
a district. This would give rise to disordered behavior, inertial decay of daily quality of life, and 
more severe property damage, leading to a spiral of urban decay (Eterno & Silverman, 2012, p. 
192). Based on this assumption, as Eterno & Silverman remark (2012, p. 15), “Citistat’s timely data 
permits the assessment and coordination of diverse social services dealing with graffiti, abandoned 
vehicles, vacant housing, lead paint abatement, urban blight, drugs, and drug treatment”.   
According to Boba Santos (2013, p. 43), the success of Compstat can be explained by two reasons: 
1) a very efficient information system enables decision makers and performance evaluators to rely 
on up-to-date data on computerized crime, arrest, and “quality of life”; 2) this information can be 
used on a regular basis for interactive crime prevention and reduction strategy meetings, where 
commanders are held accountable on a number of output measures related to crime data in their 
districts. As described by Eterno & Silverman (2012, p. 24-25), during the weekly meetings at 
police headquarters, “charts and maps compare index crime (i.e., murder, rape, robbery, felony 
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assault, burglary, grand larceny auto, and grand larceny) numbers to the same period last year at 
three levels: weekly, 28 days, and year to date… Always being compared to last year’s numbers can 
be a real burden, especially if your previous year was exceptional”. During a meeting, each 
commander stands at a podium presenting to the top management (e.g. police commissioner, first 
deputy commissioner, chief of department, and deputy commissioner of operations) statistics on 
crime control in his precinct. The commander and his collaborators are held accountable on the 
achieved outputs. His career and rewards will be affected by the measured and reported outputs. It 
may happen that “commanders are berated and embarrassed in front of their peers because the 
numbers do not look ‘correct’” (Eterno & Silverman, 2012, p. 25), i.e. they do not correspond to the 
pre-set performance standards. According to Zink (2004), this “has degenerated into a situation 
where the police leadership presses subordinates to keep numbers low by any means necessary”. 
Manipulating or ‘fudging’ crime data has been mentioned as a recurring practice adopted by the 
police to generate the expected numbers to report; for instance: “misclassify crimes from felonies to 
misdemeanors, under-value the property lost to crime so it’s not a felony”. (Eterno & Silverman, 
2012, p. 27).    
Therefore, in spite of the reported success in fighting crime, Compstat and other similar programs 
are also considered as a major cause of dysfunctional behavior and performance paradox.  
By quoting Campbell (1976), Behn (2011) remarks how “the more any quantitative social indicator 
is used for social decision-making, the more subject it will be to corruption pressures and the more 
apt it will be to distort and corrupt the social pressures it is intended to monitor”. The so-called 
“Campbell’s law” is considered as relevant to the experience of various performance measurement 
programs in crime control policy implementation. Eterno and Silverman (2012, p. 11) emphasize 
how the focus on the short run to the detriment of the long run is an effect of the commented 
phenomena. They report as follows: “False arrests have been identified as the result of arrest 
quotas”. They also remark how “arrest quotas may encourage police to focus on less difficult and 
important arrests at the expense of more significant and arduous arrests” 5. 
Based on the analysis developed so far, figure 7, 8, and 9 show how System Dynamics, when 
applied to the analysis and diagnosis of dysfunctionalities in performance 
management/measurement systems, can support the designers of such systems and other key 
decision makers in identifying the causes behind a ‘performance paradox’, and to act on them 6. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  “In 2005, New York’s city’s patrolmen’s union reported that productivity arrest quotas resulted in the arrest of an 80-
year-old man for feeding pigeons and pregnant woman for sitting down to rest on a subway station” (Murray, 2005). 6	  Rouwette et al (2007) have recently developed an interesting study on System Dynamics applied to Crime Control. 
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In particular, fig. 7 illustrates the distorted effects on reported crime produced by performance 
measures and by a reward system focused on only short-term and ‘easy to achieve’ output measures 
(quotas).  
The figure shows that the balancing loop “B1” would be the functional response of the performance 
management/measurement system to the actual crime level. An increase of this level would imply a 
higher effort to repress crime, leading (after a delay) to a reduction of crime. However, the figure 
also shows how the use of an unbalanced set of performance measures and of short-term “output-
based-only” reward mechanisms would hamper the dominance of the described balancing loop. In 
fact, the dysfunctional behavior that they would generate might foster two other loops, i.e. the 












    
The reinforcing loop “R” is generated by an increasing effort to solve ‘easy’ crimes (due to the 
existing set of performance measurement and rewards systems) and, therefore, to report an 
increasing pattern of such kind of crimes. This generates an increase in the distributed rewards, 
which in turn gives rise to the ‘search’ of new “easy-to-solve” crime to deal with and report. 
Though such a vicious loop would contribute to reduce crime (in absolute terms), it might not 
generate the desired effects on dealing with “hard-to-solve” crimes. On the other hand, the 
described system would also affect the statistics regarding such crimes (data fudging).  In fact, the 
Figure 7: Distorted effects on reported crime produced by a rewards and a 
performance measurement system focused on only short-term output measures. 	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distribution of rewards based on the described logics, would lead to a lower tendency by police to 
classify and report “hard-to-solve” crime and a higher inclination to ‘shift’ or declassify part of it to 
the lower rank of “easy-to-solve” crime. This would generate a further effort towards the repression 
of “easy-to–solve” crimes. In other words, while the loop “B2” dominance replaces the loop “B1”, 
it also provides the basis for the loop “R” to further and progressively generate its dysfunctional 
effects. 
Figure 8 adopts an instrumental view of the DPM approach to detect the dysfunctionalities caused 
by lack of alignment between performance management and rewards systems. The figure shows 
how, when performance measurement and rewards generate ‘false reporting’ on ‘easy-to-solve” 
cases, the performance management system becomes the means for the organization to reach the 
desired rewards. In other words, the performance management system here takes an ancillary role in 
respect to the rewards system, rather than using it as a means to pursue sustainable organizational 
development.   
As illustrated in fig. 8, the use of police staff and means (strategic resources) is primarily diverted 
by the rewards system to the execution of controls and preventive actions on ‘easy cases’. This 
effort contributes to generate the desired ‘numbers’, in terms of outputs, here depicted as flows of 
‘easy’ cases solved. 
The effect of this phenomenon is twofold.  
On the one hand, it allows the organization to distribute rewards, based on the achievement of the 
target number of cases to solve. A consolidated habit of the organization to accumulate rewards – as 
a consequence of a large volume of fulfilled “easy” cases – reinforces the described process, which 
implies that organizational efforts are primarily allocated to such cases.    
On the other hand, although an increase in the outflow of “easy” cases solved in a given time (end-
result) should have to determine a reduction in the stock of “easy-to-solve” crimes, this does not 
happen, because of the inflow of new false ‘easy-to-solve’ reported cases. This variable has been 
depicted in fig. 8 as an output of the rewards system, whose size is proportional to the effort on 
reporting false data, which is – in turn – proportional to the targeted number of crimes to solve 
(information stock).  
Therefore, an abnormal behavior of the rewards system here generates a set of end-results, which 
may allow the growth of the rewards system, regardless the achievement of the organizational 
results through the performance management system. On the contrary, the results measured by such 
system become a means to pursue the rewards system’s goals. 
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A further vicious effect can be refereed to unattended hard crimes. In fact, this phenomenon could 
allow a developing class of hard-crime criminals who become skilled, leading to a gradual – but 

















The insights emerging from the previous examples, about the role of DPM as a method to describe 
and detect the behavioral dysfunctions associated to the ‘performance paradox’, as in the case of the 
Compstat program, can support the identification of possible measures to adopt, in order to 
counteract the analyzed problems.    
Figure 9 provides an example on this regard. It shows how improving performance management 
systems’ quality may lead to higher promptness and selectiveness of reporting (performance driver). 
This would not only imply investing on performance measurement and information systems, but 
also on organizational design and human capital. As remarked by Behn (2008, p. 5), one of the 
main errors committed in implementing Compstat, Citistat and similar programs has been the lack 
Figure 8: Idiosyncratic behavior of rewards and performance management systems 
generating “false reporting” on ‘easy-to-solve’ cases. 	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of dedicated analytic staff to designing proper performance management systems, and to support 
decision makers in interpreting the results emerging from performance measurement.      
For instance, as shown in fig. 9, improving the promptness and selectiveness of reporting may allow 
decision makers to design policies which better balance capacity allocation in solving ‘hard’ and 
‘easy’ cases (end-results). Balancing the mix of achieved end-results (in terms of outputs) may 
contribute to better pursue a sustainable development of a public sector organization and of the 
territory where it is rooted. This is shown in fig. 9 through the outcome measure (end-result) named 
“change in community quality of life”. This variable is, in turn, affected by a performance driver, 
which is termed as “crime seriousness ratio”, which is affected by the stock of “hard-to-solve” 

















8. Conclusions.  
This paper has shown how ‘dynamic performance management’ can be used as a method to support 
the analysis and diagnosis of the “performance paradox”, i.e. a weak capability of adopted 
Figure 9: Using Performance Management Systems Quality (promptness & 
selectiveness) to support policies aimed to properly balance capacity allocation in solving 
‘hard’ and ‘easy’ cases. 	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performance indicators to measure and affect performance, especially because of behavioral 
distortions in the use of available data and information.  
As described in the paper, although such behavioral distortions are a product of the human nature, 
particularly when quantitative social indicators are used to affect social decision-making (as 
suggested by the “Campbell’s law”), they can be amplified by an improper design of performance 
management systems.  
On the one hand, a possible cause of this phenomenon can be identified into the inconsistency 
between specific adopted performance indicators and the corresponding task environment. In this 
case, behavioral distortions in using performance measures tend to be rooted at individual – before 
than group or organizational – level, and are due to the use of performance indicators which do not 
fit with the characteristics of the activities that are fulfilled by people in an organization. 
On the other hand, behavioral distortions in using performance measures can be also primarily 
related to a bounded and static perspective in the design of overall performance management 
systems. This phenomenon can imply extensive disconnections between: 1) outputs and outcomes, 
2) the political and administrative level, and 3) different institutions playing complementary roles in 
pursuing social policies (i.e. lack of joined-up-government). In this case, unintended behavioral 
phenomena that are relevant to performance management are primarily rooted at organizational or 
group – rather than individual – level. In fact, the main responsibility for the dysfunctional behavior 
can be attributed to the inconsistent design of the performance and the related systems (e.g. rewards 
and career), which are the primary cause of a flow of organizational actions, which go towards a 
direction that is not compatible to a sustainable development, in the long run.  
This second cause of behavioral distortions in performance measurement has been framed in the 
paper through a dynamic performance management view, with a specific reference to crime control 
policies at Municipal level, and particularly in relation to the implementation of the Compstat 
program. 
Though we believe that this paper has shown the usefulness of dynamic performance management 
as a method to foster a cause-and-effect perspective in dealing with behavioral distortions 
associated to city’s performance measurement programs, we also believe that further research will 
be needed to better frame, and possibly outline main archetypes related to different typologies of 
the recurring dysfunctions associated to the analyzed problem contexts. 
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